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COMMENTS
BYSTANDER RECOVERY FOR MENTAL DISTRESS
I. INTRODUCTIoN-REcOVERY FOR MENTAL DrsTREss GENERALLY
"Mental pain or anxiety the law cannot value, and does not pretend to re-
dress, when the unlawful act complained of causes that alone .... "I This often
quoted statement of Lord Wensleydale rather accurately represented the com-
mon law reluctance to recognize mental tranquillity as an independent interest
worthy of legal protection.2 Accordingly, early American cases denied recovery
where only mental injury was the basis of damages. 3 The objections to such
recovery have been several: 4 (1) Mental distress and its consequences were
deemed too remote and, hence, were not causally related to the act in question
because they lacked tangibility and depended upon the individual peculiarities
of the person injured. (2) Mental distress was so difficult to prove that it was
considered immeasureable in terms of money damages. (3) No precedent al-
lowed recovery. (4) Public policy seemed to dictate that actions for mental
distress be suppressed in order to avoid an imagined flood of spurious litigation.
These arguments, however, have been effectively "demolished" 3 as the law
evolved6 to the modem position that "[f]reedom from mental disturbance
is . . . a protected interest .... 7
Thus, although there is now an accepted legal duty upon one to refrain from
a wrongful invasion of another's mental tranquillity, much of the scope of this
duty remains undefined. What constitutes a "wrongful invasion"? Does the
right of one to enjoy freedom from such interference extend to acts directed
at certain or all third parties? Further, may a bystander recover for mental
1. Lynch v. Knight, 11 Eng. Rep. 854, 863 (H.L. 1861).
2. Lord Wensleydale's statement has been criticized: "In so far as the generalization is
true, it can hardly be based upon the reason indicated, namely, that the law cannot put a
monetary value upon the interest in question . . . 2' Magruder, Mental and Emotional
Disturbance in the Law of Torts, 49 Harv. L. Rev. 1033 (1936).
3. E.g., Williamson v. Central of Ga. Ry., 127 Ga. 125, 56 S.E. 119 (1906); Braun v.
Craven, 175 Ill. 401, 51 N.E. 657 (1898); Kalen v. Terre Haute & I.R.R., 18 Ind. App. 202,
47 N.E. 694 (1897); M itchell v. Rochester Ry., 151 N.Y. 107, 45 N.E. 354 (1896); Chittick
v. Philadelphia Rapid Transit Co., 224 Pa. 13, 73 A. 4 (1909); Memphis St. Ry. v. Bern-
stein, 137 Tenn. 637, 194 S.W. 902 (1917).
4. W. Prosser, Torts § 55, at 346-47 (3d ed. 1964) [hereinafter cited as W. Prosser];
McNiece, Psychic Injury and Tort Liability in New York, 24 St. John's L. Rev. 1, 9-10
(1949) [hereinafter cited as McNiece].
5. W. Prosser at 346-47.
6. It has been suggested that this evolution occurred in four stages, mental distess
being successively treated as (1) an element of "parasitic" damages, (2) a separate, inten-
tional tort, (3) a limited liability upon those engaged in a "common calling," and (4) a
liability upon the public generally. Amdursky, The Interest in Mental Tranquillity, 13 Buffalo
L. Rev. 339 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Amdurskyl.
7. Ferrara v. Galluchio, 5 N.Y.2d 16, 21, 152 N.E.2d 249, 252, 176 N.Y.S.2d 996, 999
(1958).
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distress occasioned by witnessing danger or injury to another caused by defen-
dant's negligent conduct? While the interest in mental tranquillity generally
has been well analyzed, 8 some examination of the historical background of this
interest is needed to understand bystander recovery because such recovery ap-
pears to depend upon the policy considerations each jurisdiction employs in
justifying protection of the interest.
II. MENTAL DIsTmEss WITH CONCURRENT BODILY INJURY-
"PARASITIC" DAMAGES
The rigid rule at common law denying recovery for mental injury was not
applied where the mental distress was alleged as a "parasitic" component of
damages.9 In Blake v. Midland Ry.,10 a wrongful death action was brought by
the decedent's widow as administratrix against the defendant railroad for the
latter's negligence in causing a railway accident. The trial judge instructed the
jury that they were to consider whether they would confine themselves to the
plaintiff's pecuniary loss or include as damages the anxiety plaintiff suffered as
a result of her husband's death. The jury returned a verdict for plaintiff which
included an award for mental injury. On appeal, it was held that compensation
should have been limited to pecuniary loss on statutory grounds." But, it was
said by Coleridge, J., that "[w]hen an action is brought by an individual for
a personal wrong, the jury, in assessing the damages, can with little difficulty
award him a solatium for his mental sufferings alone, with an indemnity for his
pecuniary loss.12 American decisions have generally been in accord with this
dictum.'8 Thus, where the defendant's negligence has caused physical injury to
8. See Bohlen, Fifty Years of Torts, 50 Harv. L. Rev. 725 (1937); Goodhart, The
Shock Cases and Area of Risk, 16 Modem L. Rev. 14 (1953); Goodhart, Emotional Shock
and the Unimaginative Taxicab Driver, 69 L.Q. Rev. 347 (1953); Smith & Solomon, Trau-
matic Neuroses in Court, 30 Va. L. Rev. 87 (1943). See also articles cited in W. Prosser at
347 n.49.
9. An element of damages is said to be "parasitic" when "the law permits elements of
harm to be considered in assessing the recoverable damage, which cannot be taken into
account in determining the primary question of liability." 1 T. Street, The Foundations of
Legal Liability 461 (1906).
10. 118 Eng. Rep. 35, 37 (Q.B. 1852).
11. The English wrongful death statute was similar to New York's present statute, N.Y.
E.P.T.L. § 5-4.3. See 118 Eng. Rep. at 37. New York cases have held that recovery can
only be had for pecuniary damages, excluding from consideration such factors as mental
anguish, grief, or loss of companionship. See, e.g., Fornaro v. Jill Bros., 42 Misc. 2d 1031,
249 N.Y.S.2d 833 (Sup. Ct.), rev'd on other grounds, 22 App. Div. 2d 695, 253 N.Y.S.2d
771 (2d Dep't 1964), aff'd, 15 N.Y.2d 819, 205 N.E.2d 862, 257 N.Y.S.2d 938 (1965).
12. 118 Eng. Rep. at 41-42.
13. Seger v. Town of Barkhamsted, 22 Conn. 290 (1853); Kline v. Kline, 158 Ind. 602, 64
N.E. 9 (1902); Anthony v. Norton, 60 Kan. 341, 56 P. 529 (1899); Geveke v. Grand
Rapids & I.R.R., 57 Mich. 589, 24 N.W. 675 (1885); Holyoke v. Grand Trunk Ry., 48
N.H. 541 (1869) ; Quinn v. Long Island R.R., 105 N.Y. 643, 13 N.E. 925 (1887) ; Ransom v.
New York & E.R.R., 15 N.Y. 415 (1857); Pennsylvania R.R. v. Allen, 53 Pa. 276 (1866);
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the plaintiff, most jurisdictions have allowed compensation for plaintiff's men-
tal distress accompanying it.14
The rationale of cases which required physical injury as a prerequisite for
recovery of mental distress damages was apparently the belief that once a
cause of action for infliction of physical harm is established, there would be
sufficient assurance that the mental injury was real.'5 This fear of "vexatious
suits and fictitious claims" has been an obstacle which apparently could be sur-
mounted only by the showing of physical injury, regardless of the nature or
degree.16
III. MIENTAL DISTRESS AND THE "IMPACT" RULE
The law inexorably evolved from a point where the interest in mental tran-
quillity was treated as an element of "parasitic" damages attached to an in-
dependent cause of action,17 to the imposition of a duty upon those engaged in
a "common calling" to avoid interference with that interest as to those dealing
with them' 8 and, finally, to the point where the interest is safeguarded from un-
Goodell v. Tower, 77 Vt. 61, 58 A. 790 (1904); Draper v. Baker, 61 Wis. 450, 21 N.W. 527
(1884).
14. Recovery for mental distress as "parasitic" damages accompanying physical harm
developed historically in three distinct areas: (1) Mental distress in the form of fright
suffered at the time of the physical injury. Easton v. United Trade School Contracting
Co., 173 Cal. 199, 159 P. 597 (1916) ; (2) Mental distress in the form of shame and humilia-
tion when the physical injury caused disfigurement. Erie R.R. v. Collins, 253 U.S. 77
(1920), aff'g 259 F. 172 (2d Cir. 1919) (recovery for "mental anguish as resulting from and
part of physical suffering"); (3) Mental distress in the form of plaintiff's fears as to the
effect of the physical injury. Ferrara v. Galluchio, 5 N.Y.2d 16, 152 N.E2d 249, 176 N.YS.2d
996 (1958) (cancerophobia caused by information from subsequent treating physician).
15. IV. Prosser at 350.
16. Recovery for mental distress as a "parasitic" component of damages is not limited
to cases where plaintiff suffers physical injury due to another's negligence but has been
extended to other causes of action. E.g., Dixon v. New York Trap Rock Corp., 293 N.Y.
509, 58 N.E.2d 517 (1944) (nuisance); Garrison v. Sun Printing & Publishing Ass'n, 207 N.Y.
1, 100 N.E. 430 (1912) (defamation); Cauverien v. DeMetz, 20 Misc. 2d 144, 188 N.Y.S.2d
627 (Sup. Ct. 1959) (conversion); Goodell v. Tower, 77 Vt. 61, 58 A. 790 (1904) (malicious
prosecution and false imprisonment).
17. "The treatment of any element of damage as a parasitic factor belongs essentially to
a transitory stage of legal evolution. A factor which is to-day recognized as parasitic will
... to-morrow be recognized as an independent basis of liability. It is merely a question of
social, economic, and industrial needs as those needs are reflected in the organic law." I T.
Street, The Foundations of Legal Liability 470 (1906).
18. 1 T. Street, The Foundations of Legal Liability 184-86 (1906). Thus, liability was
imposed upon common carriers, Gillespie v. Brooklyn Heights R.R., 178 N.Y. 347, 70 N.E.
857 (1904) (see cases cited in W. Prosser at 44-45 nn.49-57), innkeepers, DeWolf v. Ford,
193 N.Y. 397, 86 N.E. 527 (1908) (see cases cited in W. Prosser at 45 n.58), and, in the
minority of jurisdictions, telegraph companies, see cases cited in Amdursky at 346 n.60. The
federal rule governing interstate communications and the majority of state courts are to
the contrary. See cases cited in W. Prosser at 348 n.66 & 349 n.67, respectively.
1969]
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reasonable encroachments by the public generally?0 The question, then, is when
will the law recognize an independent cause of action against a member of the
general public for an interference with that interest?
Where some physical harm or other tangible consequences are not immediate
but follow at a later date the fright or shock which allegedly induced them,
there is a division in the cases. Many jurisdictions in the United States required
impact, however slight, to sustain a recovery.20 This requirement was based on
the premise that the claim was thereby made more trustworthy. In Spade v.
Lynn & Boston R.R.,2 1 an action was brought to recover for bodily injuries
caused by fright and mental disturbance. The jury was instructed that a person
cannot recover for mere fright, fear or mental distress in the absence of bodily
injury but that when the fright or shock results in bodily harm, there may be
recovery for that bodily harm and whatever mental consequences the plaintiff
may suffer. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, holding that such
instruction was error, stated: "[T] here can be no recovery for ... physical in-
juries as may be caused solely by such mental disturbance, where there is no
injury to the person from without.1 22 Prior to the decision in Battalla v. State,2 3
New York had also followed the impact rule.2 4
19. It should be noted that the intentional invasion of the interest in mental tranquillity
became the basis of a separate tort at an earlier stage in time as "the law's first step in the
independent recognition of an interest is to secure it against conduct purposely invading
it." Magruder, Mental and Emotional Disturbance in the Law of Torts, 49 Harv. L. Rev.
1033, 1058 (1936) (footnote omitted). The case law in this area is in accord with Restate-
ment (Second) of Torts § 46(1) (1965): "One who by extreme and outrageous conduct
intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional distress to another is subject to liability
for such emotional distress, and if bodily harm to the other results from it, for such bodily
harm." See cases cited in Amdursky at 345 nn.51-53. See also articles cited in W. Prosser
at 44 nA8.
20. See cases cited (by jurisdiction, state and federal) in McNiece at 14 n.40. But It
should be noted that courts in these jurisdictions find impact in minor contacts with the
plaintiff, contacts which play no role in causing the injury complained of. See W. Prosser at
350-51 & nn.84-95 (cases collected therein).
21. 168 Mass. 285, 47 N.E. 88 (1897).
22. Id. at 290, 47 N.E. at 89. It was admitted that psychic injury may proximately cause
bodily injury; and, to deny recovery for such injury but allow it for physical harm caused
directly can hardly be logically defended. The denial of the action was clearly based on the
floodgate theory and the fear of fraudulent claims.
23. 10 N.Y.2d 237, 176 N.E. 729, 219 N.Y.S.2d 34 (1961), overruling Mitchell v. Rochester
Ry., 151 N.Y. 107, 45 N.E. 354 (1896).
24. The only consistent departure from the earlier New York rule denying recovery for
mental distress absent impact was in those cases dealing with corpses. See, e.g., Gostkowsld
v. Roman Catholic Church, 262 N.Y. 320, 186 N.E. 798 (1933) (unauthorized disinterment
of the deceased's body); Finley v. Atlantic Transp. Co., 220 N.Y. 249, 115 N.E. 715 (1917)
(negligent misdelivery of deceased's body) ; Darcy v. Presbyterian Hosp., 202 N.Y. 259, 95
N.E. 695 (1911) (defendant performed an unauthorized autopsy upon the deceased) ; Xlum-
bach v. Silver Mount Cemetery Ass'n, 242 App. Div. 843, 275 N.Y.S. 180 (2d Dep't 1934),
aff'd mem., 268 N.Y. 525, 198 N.E. 386 (1935) (cemetery mislaid the body of the deceased).
The rationale for recovery in such cases cannot be grounded in logic or reason for If one
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The majority view in the United States allows recovery for psychic injury
absent impact.25 In the Battalla case, the infant plaintiff was at a ski slope
owned and operated by New York State. The infant was placed in a chair lift
by an employee who failed to secure the protective belt properly. During the
descent of the chair the infant became hysterical due to fear, thereby suffering
mental distress. Defendant moved to dismiss for failure to state a cause of
action. The Court of Claims denied the motion20 but the appellate division
reversed on the strength of Mitchell.2 7 In reversing the appellate division, the
New York Court of Appeals said: "It is our opinion that Mitchell should be
overruled. It is undisputed that a rigorous application of its rule would be un-
just, as well as opposed to experience and logic.1 28
Dulieu v. White & Sons 29 presented the English courts with an opportunity
to re-evaluate the impact rule, which had prevailed in that country for the same
policy reasons that had supported its application in the United States. Plaintiff
suffered severe emotional shock when a van, negligently driven by defendant's
employee, went out of control and crashed into a tavern where she was tending
bar. The fright which she suffered at this occurrence resulted in the premature
birth of her child and caused the child to be born an idiot. The court, by Ken-
nedy, J., rejected the defendant's argument that lack of impact precluded recov-
ery for mental distress and, upon re-examination of the impact rule generally,
concluded that it was no longer consistent with the policy considerations of
modern jurisprudence.30 Having rejected the impact rule, the court placed
England in accord with the majority view in the United States.
can recover for the negligent treatment of the dead body of a relative, why should recovery
be denied for the negligent treatment of a living relative? Perhaps the distinction is that in
the "corpse" cases, there is an "especial likelihood of genuine and serious mental distress,
arising from the special circumstances, which serves as a guarantee that the claim is not
spurious." W. Prosser at 349. Whatever the soundness of this contention, the "special cir-
cumstances," e.g., the reverence one feels upon the death of a loved one which focuses upon
that person's earthly remains, are, in effect, a substitute for the usual requirement of impact.
25. See cases cited (by jurisdiction) in McNiece at 16 n.43.
26. 17 Misc. 2d 548, 184 N.YS.2d 1016 (Ct. Cl. 1959).
27. 11 App. Div. 2d 613, 200 N.YS.2d 852 (3d Dep't 1960).
28. 10 N.Y.2d at 239, 176 N.E.2d at 730, 219 N.Y-S.2d at 35.
29. [1901] 2 K.B. 669, rejecting Victorian Rys. Comm'rs v. Coultas, [18881 13 App. Cas.
222 (P. C.) (Austl.).
30. The court made the following points: (1) The argument that such injury is too re-
mote is neither medically nor legally sound. [1901] 2 KB. at 677. (2) Once physical injury
is said to be caused by fright or shock, it remains for the jury to determine if the damages
alleged ought to be held proximately caused. Id. at 678-79. (3) If such damages are held to
be a proximate cause of the physical injury, it cannot be said "[t]hat fright-where physical
injury is directly produced by it---cannot be a ground of action merely beamuse of the ab-
sence of any accompanying impact .... " Id. at 673. (4) The rationale that such actions are
to be discouraged on the ground of public policy alone cannot be accepted. The court stated:
"[Ilf, as is admitted, and I think justly admitted, by [Spade v. Lynn & B.R.R, 168 Mass.
285, 47 N.E. 88 (1897)], a claim for damages for physical injuries naturally and directly
resulting from nervous shock which is due to the negligence of another in causing fear of
19691
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IV. MENTAL DisTRss AND BYSTANDER RECOvERY-ENGLAND
A further aspect of the Dulieu decision, which may well have been of equal
importance to the law of mental distress recovery as was its rejection of the
impact rule, was the statement in the opinion of Judge Kennedy that: "The
shock, where it operates through the mind, must be a shock which arises from
a reasonable fear of immediate personal injury to oneself." 31 Although the issue
of bystander recovery was not before the court in Dulieu, the dictum contained
therein would appear to preclude recovery by one other than the person threat-
ened with "immediate personal injury."
Some twenty years later, however, the issue of bystander recovery was di-
rectly before the court in Hambrook v. Stokes Brothers, 2 thereby necessitating
an evaluation of Judge Kennedy's statement. Defendant's employee parked
a truck at the top of a steep road without properly engaging the emergency
brake. Plaintiff's wife, pregnant at the time, had just left her children after
walking them part of the way to their school when she saw the unattended
truck coming in her direction from around a bend in the road. She realized im-
mediately that the truck had passed the place where she left her children and
that the narrowness of the road created a distinct possibility that they had been
injured by the truck. Upon returning around the bend in the road, she saw a
crowd gathered and was informed that a child answering the description of her
daughter had been severely injured. Plaintiff alleged that the mental distress
suffered by his wife as a result of this event caused her to miscarry, occasioned
other severe physical injuries and, ultimately, brought about her death. The
evidence was unclear as to whether the wife's nervous shock was caused primar-
ily by fear for her children or what was told her at the scene of the accident.
It is significant that the defendant admitted negligence choosing, instead, to
defend on the issue of proximate cause.
The trial court instructed the jury according to the dictum in Dulien and ver-
dict was for the defendant. In reversing the judgment below, the appellate court
could not agree on the grounds therefor. Bankes, L.J., based his opinion on the
ground that if defendant's vehicle runs out of control in a populated street, it
is reasonably foreseeable that a person would be frightened of immediate physi-
cal injury so as to sustain nervous shock resulting in an adverse physical condi-
tion. He drew no distinction between that case and one in which the person
fears for her child and not for herself.83 However, he would limit recovery to
immediate bodily hurt is in principle not too remote to be recoverable in law, I should be
sorry to adopt a rule which would bar all such claims on grounds of policy alone, and In
order to prevent the possible success of unrighteous or groundless actions." Id. at 681.
31. [1901] 2 K.B. at 675.
32. [19251 1 K.B. 141 (CA. 1924).
33. Id. at 151. Hence, so long as plaintiff is within that class which may be Injured by
defendant's act, it is sufficient that the fright was suffered due to fear of injury for the
child. This argument is weakened by the fact that the evidence is questionable concerning
the danger of bodily injury to the mother. The truck was proceeding in her direc-
tion and did strike a building close to where she was standing. However, she appeared to
have ample time to avoid a threatened impact, if indeed such a threat existed.
[Vol. 3 7
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those instances where the shock was due to fear of immediate physical harm to
one's self or children and such fear is apprehended by one's unaided senses, not
by information received from others. 34 Atkin, L.J., argued that once there is a
breach of duty, the wrongdoer is liable for the consequences, even though the
type of damage may be unexpected-namely, shock. 5 He found a breach of
duty to the plaintiff's wife on the ground that the owner or operator of a vehi-
cle has "a duty to use reasonable care to avoid injuring [all wayfarers] using
the highway."3 6 Sargant, L.J., dissented on primarily two grounds: (1) There
can be no recovery unless the wife apprehended physical harm to herself. On
this point, the apprehension of harm was not shown. 37 (2) Liability should not
be extended to third parties as the defendant could not be expected to reason-
ably foresee harm to such persons. The defendant's duty does not extend to all
users of the highway in such cases.38
The Hambrook decision is generally cited for the proposition that where the
defendant owes a duty to the bystander, recovery is allowed even though the
plaintiff apprehended harm not to himself but to a third party.39 Thus, in Owens
v. Liverpool Corp.,40 the relatives of a deceased were allowed to recover for
mental distress when the hearse carrying the deceased was struck by a vehicle
negligently operated by the defendant. The plaintiffs were in the car to the rear
of the hearse and only one of them saw the actual impact, the other three
merely seeing its effects (the coffin overturned and was nearly ejected onto the
road). The court cited Hambrook for the rule that the shock need not arise
from fear of immediate personal injury to oneself4' and went on to state that
"the right to recover damages for mental shock caused by the negligence of a
defendant is not limited to cases in which apprehension as to human safety is
involved."' 4 It can be argued that Owens follows, and perhaps extends, Ham-
brook. But it is interesting that Owens involved shock suffered as the result of
negligence affecting a corpse.43
The difficulty with Hambrook is its broad basis of liability. In Bourhill v.
Young,4 the court, seizing the opportunity to limit Hambrook, denied recovery
34. [1925] 1 K.E. at 152.
35. Id. at 156.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 165.
38. Id. at 162-64. In deference to the majority, he suggested that, upon retrial, the judge
instruct the jury to find whether plaintiff's wife suffered shock due solely to "her own un-
aided realization of what had happened, or was due wholly or partly to what she heard
from bystanders." Id. at 165. He assumed the latter alternative would be found as fact and
liability would thereby be denied.
39. At least where the bystander is the parent of the third party, if the opinion of
Bankes, L.J., is to be strictly applied.
40. [19391 1 K.B. 394 (CA. 1938).
41. Id. at 399.
42. Id. at 400.
43. See note 24 supra.
44. [1943] A.C. 92 (Scot. 1942).
1969]
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to a bystander who did not witness a collision between a motorcyclist and an
automobile and, being behind another vehicle from which she had just alighted,
was never in fear, or danger, of immediate physical harm but thereafter suf-
fered emotional harm upon viewing the accident scene. The court stated that a
duty is owed to "'persons so placed that they may reasonably be expected to
be injured by the omission to take such [proper] care.' ", Hence, the orbit of
duty is defined in terms of the "zone of physical risk" test, e.g., the bystander
must be within the zone of physical harm, as reasonably foreseen by an ordi.
nary man, in order to recover for mental distress. Each of the five judges re-
served opinion on the soundness of the holding in Hambrook, mererly distin.
guishing it on the ground that the defendant had admitted liability in that
case.
46
King v. Phillips47 interpreted Bourhill as meaning that emotional harm is the
injury which must be foreseeable 48 and, therefore, plaintiff need not be within
the area of physical danger. Foreseeability, then, is not restricted to damage
causing physical injury.49 Applying the "foreseeability of emotional harm" ra-
tionale, recovery in the instant case was denied when a mother, hearing a
scream, looked out an upstairs window seventy yards away from the point at
which defendant's taxicab had struck her child. Of great importance in this
case was the fact that the driver could not anticipate that the mother would
see the accident. 50
45. Id. at 102 (citation omitted).
46. The court argued that there is a different standard of foresecability to be applied
where the issue is liability rather than the remoteness of injury. For instance, a person of
particularly sensitive susceptibilities may not be within the defendant's reasonable foresight.
Hence, there is no duty to this person. However, once it is established that the defendant has
breached a duty toward that person, the defendant must take the victim as he finds him.
On the issue of damages, therefore, the plaintiff's particular susceptibility may be a factor.
[19431 A.C. at 109-10. The court's distinction of Hambrook is not altogether valid, however,
because the defendant's pleading in that case did not limit that court's deliberation on the
issue of liability. The legal duty owed to wayfarers, in general, and plaintiff, in particular,
was clearly stated in Hambrook.
47. [1953] 1 Q.B. 429.
48. "It seems to me that each member of the House of Lords [in Bourhill] based his
decision on the ground that the motor-cyclist could not reasonably have been expected to
have foreseen that the [plaintiff] would suffer injury by emotional shock. The test applied
was not foreseeability of physical injury, but foreseeability of emotional shock." Id. at 438.
49. Singleton, LJ. stated: "I find it difficult to draw a distinction between damage from
physical injury and damage from shock; prima fade, one would think that, if a driver
should reasonably have foreseen either, and damage resulted from the one or from the
other, the plaintiff would be entitled to succeed." Id. at 437.
50. "The driver owed a duty to the boy, but he knew nothing of the mother; she was
not on the highway; he could not know that she was at the window, nor was there any
reason why he should anticipate that she would see his cab at all .... 11 Id. at 436. But see
Goodhart, Emotional Shock and the Unimaginative Taxicab Driver, 69 L.Q, Rev. 347, 350-
51 (1953), wherein the author compares the foresight of the cab driver in King with a case
in which the driver of a horse and van left it unattended in the street. A boy threw a stone
at the horses; they bolted and, a quarter of a mile away, injured the plaintiff who ran into
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Since neither Hambrook nor BourhiUl have been overruled, the law in England
is presently in a state of uncertainty. There are two distinct tests of liability,51
with King providing a broader base for recovery than Bourhil. Thus, in Board-
mant v. Sanderson,52 recovery for mental distress was awarded to a plaintiff who
was clearly outside the zone of physical danger but who, because of defendant's
knowledge that he was in the vicinity, was within the zone of foreseeable
emotional harm.53
V. MENTAL DIsm ss AND BYSTANDER RECoVERY-UNTED STATES
A. Majority View--"Zone of Physical Risk" Doctrine
The overwhelming weight of authority in the United States denies recovery
for mental distress in bystander cases, and does so primarily on two grounds:
(1) the "zone of physical risk" test, and (2) the "impact" test.54
In the leading case of Waube v. Warrington, 5 it was held that recovery
would be denied a plaintiff who is not placed in danger of immediate physical
harm by the defendant's act. A mother was looking out the window of her home
the street to stop them when he apprehended a woman and child in danger. Defendant was
held liable.
51. In the course of his opinion in King, Denning, L.J. decided that the facts of the case
were substantially similar to Hambrook but concluded that the shock complained of was too
remote to allow recovery. His rationale was that the descent of the runaway truck in Ham-
brook presented a case different from the slow backing of a taxicab. [1953] 1 Q.B. at 442.
This position has been justly criticized: "[It may be suggested that it is not immediately
obvious why a mother should receive less of a shock when she sees her child being slowly
run over than when it is done rapidly. The length of time consumed would seem at first
sight to increase rather than to lessen the effect of such a shock." Goodhart, Emotional
Shock and the Unimaginative Taxicab Driver, 69 L.Q. Rev. 347, 352-53 (1953). In any
event, it may be suggested that in holding plaintiff's mental distress too remote, the "fore-
seeability of emotional harm" test is no more than the "zone of physical risk" concept cast
in different language.
52. [19641 1 W.L.R. 1317 (CA.).
53. Plaintiff, his eight year old boy and defendant went to a garage to collect defendant's
car. While plaintiff was in the garage office paying the repair bill for defendant, the defen-
dant backed his vehicle in a negligent manner causing injury to plaintiff's child. Recovery
was allowed on the theory that defendant knew plaintiff was within earshot and, upon hear-
ing a scream and coming to his child's assistance, it was reasonably foreseeable that plain-
tiff would suffer nervous shock.
54. A third theory having less application has been proximate cause, i.e., plaintiff's
injury is deemed too remote. Even where the plaintiff was in the zone of danger, courts
have denied recovery thereby suggesting that it is the nature of the injury which is the
real obstacle. W. Prosser at 353. Thus, in Edwards v. Mlranne, 11 So. 2d 271 (La.
Ct. App. 1942), a husband sought to recover for mental distress occasioned by bodily
injury to his wife when he and his wife were involved in an automobile collision. Held, the
wife's injury was superficial and, therefore, "wholly insufficient to arouse any mental anxiety
from which a defendant could be held answerable." 11 So. 2d at 272; accord, Carey v. Pure
Distrib. Corp., 124 S.W.2d 847 (Tex. Sup. Ct. 1939).
55. 216 Wis. 603, 258 N.W. 497 (1935).
1969]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
watching her child cross a highway. She witnessed the killing of the child due
to the defendant's negligent operation of an automobile. As a result, the mother
suffered severe nervous shock which caused physical illness and, ultimately, her
death. This action was brought by the husband as special administrator of the
estate of his deceased wife. The issue was "whether the mother of a child who,
although not put in peril or fear of physical impact, sustains the shock of wit-
nessing the negligent killing of her child, may recover for physical injuries
caused by such fright or shock." 56 The court cited Palsgraf v. Long Island
R.R.57 for the proposition that the "plaintiff sues in her own right for a wrong
personal to her, and not as the vicarious beneficiary of a breach of duty to
another. '5 8 No duty was found owing to the mother in Waube as she was not
within the zone of physical danger.69
Those jurisdictions which base recovery on the fact that plaintiff was within
the "zone of physical risk" are, in effect, using that doctrine to determine when
the defendant owes a legal duty to the plaintiff. It has been stated that "'[i] n
every instance, before negligence can be predicated of a given act, back of the
act must be sought and found a duty to the individual complaining, the
observance of which would have averted or avoided the injury.' "00 That duty
has been found where the plaintiff is threatened with immediate physical harm.
Thus, if the plaintiff is within the zone of danger, an initial breach to that plain-
tiff is established. The fact that plaintiff suffers physical harm through fright
at the peril or injury to a third party,0 1 rather than through impact, is irrele-
vant. Recovery will be allowed as "it becomes merely a matter of the unexpected
manner in which the foreseeable harm has occurred .... ,,02
B. Majority View-"Impact" Rule
Those jurisdictions which require an impact upon the plaintiff to justify
recovery for his own mental distress, of course, deny recovery to one who
56. Id. at 605, 258 N.W. at 497.
57. 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928).
58. Id. at 342, 162 N.E. at 100.
59. "It is our conclusion that [defendant's duty and plaintiff's right] can neither justly
nor expediently be extended to any recovery for physical injuries sustained by one out of
the range of ordinary physical peril as a result of the shock of witnessing another's danger."
216 Wis. at 613, 258 N.W. at 501. See also Angst v. Great N. Ry., 131 F. Supp. 156 (D,
Minn. 1955); Resavage v. Davies, 199 Md. 479, 86 A.2d 879 (1952); Bowman v. Williams,
164 Md. 397, 165 A. 182 (1933); Barber v. Pollock, 104 N.H. 379, 187 A.2d 788 (1963);
Cote v. Litawa, 96 N.H. 174, 71 A.2d 792 (1950); All v. John Gerber Co., 36 Tenn. App.
134, 252 S.W.2d 138 (1952); Nucdes v. Tennessee Elec. Power Co., 155 Tenn. 611, 299 S.W.
775 (1927) ; Frazee v. Western Dairy Prods., 182 Wash. 578, 47 P.2d 1037 (1935); Klassa v.
Milwaukee Gas Light Co., 273 Wis. 176, 77 N.W.2d 397 (1956).
60. 248 N.Y. 339, 342, 162 N.E. 99, 99-100 (1928) (citations omitted).
61. It has been stated that the status of the bystander is a factor and that where plaintiff
is unrelated to the injured party, recovery is denied. 14 Buffalo L. Rev. 332, 333 n.12 (1964).
While this is true as to the weight of the decided cases, it cannot be said to be a universal
rule. See Webb v. Francis J. Lewald Coal Co., 214 Cal. 182, 4 P.2d 532 (1931) (discussed
in note 104 infra).
62. W. Prosser at 353.
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suffers mental injury by witnessing injury to a third person.63 Thus, in Knaub
v. Gotwalt,64 the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania denied recovery for mental
distress suffered by the parents and sister of a child in witnessing that child's
death. It is significant that the sister was crossing the street with the decedent
and was only three feet away at the time of impact to the decedent. The court
stated that: "[The impact] rule applies even where the complaining party
seeking relief was not merely a nearby witness but the actual victim of the
alleged negligent or frightening conduct." 65
This rule is carried to an illogical extreme in Beaty v. Buckeye Fabric Finish-
ing Co.,66 a diversity action decided under Arkansas law. Plaintiff was a citizen
of Arkansas. The defendant Buckeye was an Ohio corporation and the individual
defendant, McCurdy, was a citizen of that state. Plaintiff was proceeding on a
highway and her father was a passenger in her vehicle. An oncoming car
signalled for a left turn and plaintiff slowed down to allow that car to cross her
lane of travel whereupon a tractor-trailer, owned by defendant Buckeye and
driven by defendant McCurdy, struck the rear of plaintiff's car. The impact
was not severe, although plaintiff did suffer some bodily injury. Plaintiff pulled
onto the right shoulder of the roadway and the driver of the trailer pulled in
behind her. Both drivers exited to inspect the damage to their respective
vehicles. McCurdy set the emergency brake but left the trailer's motor running.
Meanwhile, plaintiff's father exited plaintiff's car from the right side and walked
to a point between the rear of plaintiff's car and the front of the truck. Some
three minutes later, the truck's brake failed and the truck lurched forward,
momentarily pinning the father to the rear of the car. As the car rolled forward
from this second impact, the father fell to the ground and was crushed by the
wheels of the tractor-trailer. He cried out, lost consciousness as the wheels went
over him and subsequently died. The entire scene was within the sight and
hearing of the plaintiff. Plaintiff's cause of action for mental distress, caused by
the father's death in her presence, was denied. After proclaiming Arkansas an
"impact state"67 the court stated: "[S]he is confronted with the difficulty that
she was injured in one accident and her father was killed as a result of another
which, although following the first very closely, was, nevertheless, entirely
separate and distinct from it. The physical impact upon the plaintiff was
caused by the negligence of McCurdy in the operation of the truck upon the
highway, whereas the injuries to and death of [plaintiff's father] were caused
63. Beaty v. Buckeye Fabric Finishing Co., 179 F. Supp. 688 (E.D. Ark. 1959); Southern
Ry. v. Jackson, 146 Ga. 243, 91 S.E. 28 (1916); Cleveland, C.C. & St. L. Ry. v. Stewart,
24 Ind. App. 374, 56 N.E. 917 (1900); Mahoney v. Dankwart, 108 Iowa 321, 79 NAV. 134
(1899); Duet v. Cheramie, 176 So. 2d 667 (La. Ct. App. 1965); Holland v. Good Bros.,
318 Mass. 300, 61 N.E2d 544 (1945) ; Keyes v. Minneapolis & St. L. Ry., 36 Blinn. 290, 30
N.W. 888 (1886); Knaub v. Gotwalt, 422 Pa. 267, 220 A.2d 646 (1966); Davis v. Tacoma
Ry. & Power Co., 35 Wash. 203, 77 P. 209 (1904).
64. 422 Pa. 267, 220 A2d 646 (1966).
65. Id. at 270, 220 A2d at 647.
66. 179 F. Supp. 688 (E.D. Ark. 1959).
67. Id. at 697.
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by subsequent negligence of McCurdy in the parking and securing of the
vehicle." 86
Although the case was decided on other grounds, the court in Beaty assumed,
without deciding, that if the plaintiff's father bad been killed and plaintiff
had been injured in the same accident, Arkansas law would permit a recovery
for plaintiff's attendant mental distress.0 9 Some jurisdictions have allowed re-
covery in such cases. In Greenberg v. Stanley,70 plaintiff suffered severe psycho-
logical disturbances arising out of an accident in which her infant child was
fatally injured. The accident occurred when two cars collided, one mounting
the curb after the collision and striking both the plaintiff and her child. New
Jersey is an "impact state" and, therefore, a cause of action for mental distress
is denied where there has been no impact upon the plaintiff. That rule is ex-
tended to onlookers who suffer anguish due to the infliction of injury upon third
parties. 7' The court allowed recovery on the ground that "the entire, insepa-
rable, resulting psychiatric complex, induced partly by the emotionally shocking
and unexpected trauma to the plaintiff herself and partly by her simultaneous
concern for her injured child, [interacted] to produce the whole resulting
psychoneurosis and its sequelae. ''72
Other jurisdictions, however, have held that the mere fact that plaintiff suffers
personal injury does not warrant recovery for mental anguish from the simul-
taneous injury or endangerment to third parties in the same accident episode.78
Thus, in Lessard v. Tarca,74 plaintiff was denied recovery for mental distress
sustained as a result of watching one of her children burn to death in the
wreckage of an automobile accident. Plaintiff, her husband and her other three
children suffered concurrent physical injury in that accident. The court held
that each of the injured parties could recover damages for emotional distress,
pain, suffering and shock but such damages could not include that which arose
from witnessing injury to another. 75
68. Id. at 698.
69. Id.
70. 51 NJ. Super. 90, 143 A.2d 588 (App. Div. 1958).
71. Id. at 106-07, 143 A.2d at 597.
72. Id. at 107, 143 A.2d at 598. The fact that plaintiff suffered some personal Injury,
regardless of how slight, justified recovery for mental distress. See Chesapeake & 0. Ry. v.
Robinett, 151 Ky. 778, 152 S.W. 976 (1913) where plaintiff and her father were passengers
on defendant's railroad. The conductor assaulted the father causing him to fail against
plaintiff which, in turn, caused plaintiff to fall against the arm of a seat. Plaintiff brought
this action to recover for bodily injury caused by her own fall and mental distress caused
by the assault upon the father. Held, the rule that plaintiff cannot recover for mere fright
is inapplicable in this case as there was "impact" upon the plaintiff when her father was
caused to fall against her. Id. at 784, 152 S.W. at 979. Hence, plaintiff may be compensated
for "the physical and mental suffering . . . that may have been directly caused her by the
physical impact and fright, if any, resulting from the wrongful assault and battery com-
mitted upon her father . . . ." Id.
73. Sherwood v. Ticheli, 10 La. App. 280, 120 So. 107 (1929); Fleming v. Lobel, 59 A.
28 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1904); Taylor v. Spokane, P. & S. Ry., 72 Wash. 378, 130 P. 506 (1913).
74. 20 Conn. Supp. 295, 133 A.2d 625 (Super. Ct. 1957).
75. Id. at 298-99, 133 A.2d at 628.
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C. The New York Rule
As noted earlier, New York had been an "impact state" prior to Battalla.
The question today is what effect has the Battalla decision had upon bystander
recovery in New York. In 1961, the Kalina" case concerned an action against
a hospital (and the attending doctor) for mental distress suffered by the parents
of a boy who had been circumcised by the defendant hospital after the hospital
had been given notice that the boy was to be circumcised in accordance with
the tenets of the Orthodox Jewish faith. Defendant's motion to dismiss for
failure to state a cause of action was granted3 7 The court stated that: "We
deem it the intention of the Battalla case to realistically enlarge the damage
claim of one acted against. It did not intend to provide a cause of action for
interested bystanders hitherto excluded."78
Kalina, then, would appear to preclude recovery in an onlooker action for
mental distress. But two factors are of special importance: (1) This was not
a true bystander case on its facts, and (2) The decision could have rested upon
the well-settled rule in New York that "[t]he parent's rights in an action for
injuries to the child are restricted to an action for the loss of the child's services
and for medical attendance and expenses."7t Should Kalina be conclusive on
the question of bystander recovery where the plaintiff is bringing the action
in his own right? In his excellent dissent in the Appellate Division,s ° Justice
Halpern stated:
This case does not involve the question of the right of a plaintiff to recover for
emotional distress caused by the witnessing of the infliction of an injury upon a third
person or caused by hearing an account of such an injury. The impact of the Bottalla
decision upon that type of case is still to be determined. Here the claim is for the
infliction of emotional distress by the defendants directly upon the plaintiffs them-
selves by an act violating their religious beliefs. The cause of action is not for the
injury to the child but for the direct injury to the plaintiffs.8 '
Approximately one year after the Kalina case, Berg v. Bauns and Lahann
v. Cravotta8 3 were decided. In both cases, a parent sought to recover for mental
distress occasioned by witnessing his child injured due to the negligence of
defendant. In Lahann, the child's injuries resulted in death. Recovery was
denied in both on the ground that Battalia did not overturn the "impact" rule
in favor of bystanders in whose presence the accident occurs. The basis for the
76. Kalina v. General Hosp., 31 Misc. 2d 18, 220 N.YS.2d 733 (Sup. Ct. 1961), aff'd
mem., 18 App. Div. 2d 757, 235 N.Y.S.2d 808 (4th Dep't 1962), aff'd, 13 N.Y.2d 1023, 195
N.E.2d 309, 245 N.Y.S.2d 599 (1963).
77. 31 Misc. 2d 18, 220 N.Y.S.2d 733 (Sup. Ct. 1961).
78. Id. at 20, 220 N.Y.S2d at 736.
79. Fiorello v. New York Prot. Epis. City Miss. Socy, 217 App. Div. 510, 514, 217
N.Y.S. 401, 406 (1st Dep't 1926). See also Roher v. State, 279 App. Div. 1116, 112 N.Y.S.
2d 603 (3d Dep't 1952); Blessington v. Autry, 105 N.Y.S.2d 953 (Sup. Ct. 1951).
80. 18 App. Div. 2d 757, 235 N.Y.S2d 808 (4th Dep't 1962).
81. Id. at 760, 235 N.Y.S.2d at 814.
82. 224 N.Y.S.2d 974 (Sup. Ct. 1962).
83. 228 N.Y.S.2d 371 (Sup. Ct. 1962).
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decision in Lahann was that there was no duty owed to the bystander;8 4 Berg
merely quoted from the holding in Kalina that Battalla does not "provide a
cause of action for interested bystanders."85
Then, in 1964, Haight v. McEwens6 departed from the trend of the other
recent New York cases. In Haight, plaintiff sought to recover for mental distress
caused by witnessing her son killed by the defendant's negligent operation of
an automobile. Plaintiff was present and watching her son crossing a highway
at the time of the occurrence. The defendant moved to dismiss the complaint
on the ground that it failed to state a cause of action. The motion was denied.
In reaching its decision, the court relied on a recent California decision, Aimaya
v. Home Ice, Fuel & Supply Co.87 and on the English case of Hambrook v.
Stokes Brothers.88 These two decisions are based on the theory that a parent
who witnesses the exposure of his child to danger or actual injury is within the
class of persons to whom the defendant owes a duty of care. The court disposed
of Kalina's interpretation of Battalla as dicta. The case was remanded, however,
to determine at trial if the defendant should have anticipated the mother's
presence and, therefore, whether or not the fright suffered was a foreseeable
consequence of defendant's negligence. 89
Bond v. Smith90 was decided in 1966 and added nothing but confusion to
an already confused body of law. Plaintiff and her husband were walking on the
shoulder of a road when the vehicle operated by defendant crossed the center-
line and struck plaintiff's husband. He was killed instantly, and his body was
thrown so that it struck the plaintiff. The defendant contended that plaintiff
could not recover damages for emotional and mental shock caused by witness-
ing the injuries to, and death of, her husband. The court granted defendant's
motion to dismiss, concluding that the New York cases which denied bystander
recovery did so on the ground that the negligence of the defendant has not had
sufficient causal relation to the injuries of the plaintiff.9 1 However, implicit in
the Bond holding is the idea that proximate cause could be found where the
plaintiff was within the zone of danger.9 2 The troublesome aspect of such a
84. Id. at 373; see Lula v. Sivaco Wire & Nail Co., 265 F. Supp. 222 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
85. 224 N.Y.S.2d at 976.
86. 43 Misc. 2d 582, 251 N.Y.S.2d 839 (Sup. Ct. 1964).
87. 23 Cal. Rptr. 131 (Dist. Ct. App. 1962), rev'd, 59 Cal. 2d 295, 379 P.2d 513, 29 Cal.
Rptr. 33 (1963), overruled by Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 766, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr.
72 (1968).
88. [1925] 1 K.B. 141 (discussed in text accompanying note 32 supra).
89. The court appears to be constructing a test of "foreseeability of emotional harm"
as in King v. Phillips, [19531 1 Q.B. 429 (discussed in text accompanying note 47 supra).
90. 52 Misc. 2d 186, 274 N.Y.S.2d 534 (Sup. Ct. 1966).
91. Thus, "it could be said that it was held as a matter of law that the negligence of
the defendant was not the proximate cause of the injuries (mental and emotional distress)
to the plaintiff." Id. at 188-89, 274 N.Y.S.2d at 536.
92. "In the present case the question of the proximate cause of the plaintiff's mental and
emotional distress should be submitted to a jury for them to determine whether or not
these injuries were caused by the fact of her witnessing the injuries to her husband or her
nearness to the defendant's automobile." Id. at 189, 274 N.Y.S.2d at 536.
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finding is that the zone of danger concept has traditionally been the test for
finding a duty owing to the plaintiff on grounds other than proximate cause.
The argument from proximate cause in Bond is also questionable on the facts
of that case. First, there is the tendency of the courts to allow recovery for
mental distress as a result of physical injury caused by an "impact" which,
by its nature, could play no role in causing the injury.93 Once physical injury
is established through impact, mental distress as an element of "parasitic"
damages would certainly be in accordance with precedent. 94 In this respect, it
is significant that the defendant did not "object to [plaintiff] seeking damages
for [fright, mental and emotional shock, and injury to her nervous system
caused by the fact of her witnessing the injuries to and the death of her hus-
band] if she sustained the same as a result of her being struck down in the
same accident."9 5 The second, albeit less compelling, factor is the line of cases
which allows recovery for mental distress where there is simultaneous injury
or endangerment to third parties in the same accident.90
The recent decision in Tobin v. Grossman~7  is in line with what appears to
be the weight of authority in New York. Plaintiff's child was injured due to
the defendant's negligent operation of an automobile. The plaintiff allegedly
witnessed the accident but at a pre-trial examination she stated that she was
actually inside the house at the time, heard the squeal of brakes and came out
to see her child lying on the lawn. The court accepted the facts most favorable
to plaintiff.98 In dismissing the plaintiff's cause of action for mental distress, the
court relied on the following: 99 (1) The dicta in Kalina that Battalla did not
extend a cause of action to interested bystanders; (2) The Knaub line of cases
which deny recovery in the absence of impact; and (3) The Amaya decision
which, on appeal, denied recovery to a parent for mental distress caused by
witnessing injury to her child.
While the majority of recent decisions appear to deny recovery to a by-
stander for his mental distress suffered upon witnessing injury to a third party,
the law in New York is not settled. Kalina has generally been followed but, as
in Haight, it could be considered mere dicta. New York courts have also placed
emphasis upon the Amaya decision at various stages of its judicial history.100
Therefore, it appears that the issue of bystander recovery must await an
authoritative determination by the New York Court of Appeals. 1
0
'
93. See W. Prosser at 350-51 & nn.84-95 (cases collected therein). See also Chesapeake &
0. Ry. v. Robinett, 151 Ky. 778, 152 S.V. 976 (1913) (discussed in note 72 supra).
94. See Section II supra.
95. 52 Misc. 2d at 187, 274 N.Y.S.2d at 535.
96. See text accompanying notes 69-72 supra.
97. 30 App. Div. 2d 229, 291 N.Y.S.2d 227 (3d Dep't 1968), rev'g 55 Mlisc. 2d 304, 284
N.Y.S.2d 997 (Sup. Ct. 1967).
98. 30 App. Div. 2d at 231, 291 N.Y.S.2d at 229.
99. Id. at 231-32, 291 N.Y.S.2d at 229.
100. The Supreme Court of California held against recovery for the parent-bystander,
but it is interesting to note that since the decision in Tobin v. Grossman, Amaya has been
overruled. See note 87 supra.




Although the "impact rule" has long been rejected by the courts of Cali-
fornia in cases where the negligent act was directed at the plaintiff person-
ally,10 2 the decisions in that jurisdiction generally denied recovery for mental
distress in bystander actions except where there was some element of physical
injury,'0 3 or a reasonable fear of such injury,10 4 to the plaintiff. Thus, where
a bystander suffered mental distress merely as a result of witnessing an acci-
dent, 0 5 or its aftermath, 06 or as a result of fearing for the safety of another, 0 7
N.Y.S.2d 305 (1968), overruling Kronenbitter v. Washburn Wire Co., 4 N.Y.2d 524, 151
N.E.2d 898, 176 N.Y.S.2d 354 (1958). In allowing a wife to recover for loss of consortium,
the court stated that there is a "growing recognition that the law of torts must recognize
the interest of persons in the protection of essentially emotional interests .... The policy
of modern tort law has been to expand tort liability 'in the just effort to afford decent
compensatory measure to those injured by the wrongful conduct of others.'" 22 N.Y.2d
at 507, 239 N.E.2d at 902, 293 N.Y.S. 2d at 311-12 (citation omitted). This broad language
could well signify the inclination of the Court of Appeals to allow recovery for mental dis-
tress in an action by one witnessing danger or injury to a third party.
102. Sloane v. Southern Cal. Ry., 111 Cal. 668, 44 P. 320 (1896). This was at a time
when other jurisdictions clung to its arbitrary application. See cases collected in Cook v.
Maier, 33 Cal. App. 2d 581, 584-85, 92 P.2d 434, 435-36 (Dist. Ct. App. 1939).
103. In Lindley v. Knowlton, 179 Cal. 298, 176 P. 440 (1918), a chimpanzee owned by
defendant was kept in so negligent a manner that it escaped its enclosure and entered the
home of the plaintiff. It attacked plaintiff's two children successively, choking one of them
severely, before plaintiff fought the animal off. Because of this ordeal, plaintiff was granted
recovery for severe shock and hysteria in addition to the damages for physical injuries In-
curred in her fight with the animal.
104. Liability could be predicated upon fright induced by the plaintiff's reasonable fear
for the safety of another so long as plaintiff simultaneously feared for his own safety.
Kelly v. Fretz, 19 Cal. App. 2d 356, 65 P.2d 914 (Dist. Ct. App. 1937). In Webb v. Francis
J. Lewald Coal Co., 214 Cal. 182, 4 P.2d 532 (1931), plaintiff was allowed to recover for
emotional distress when defendant's employee negligently drove a truck into the front of
a shop operated by plaintiff. This case is quite interesting in that plaintiff feared not only
for her own safety, but also for the safety of a stranger-the driver of the truck.
105. Reed v. Moore, 156 Cal. App. 2d 43, 319 P.2d 80 (Dist. Ct. App. 1958) (plaintiff
was denied recovery for shock and a resultant miscarriage caused when she witnessed,
from the front of her home about 130 feet from the point of impact, an automobile acci-
dent involving her husband).
106. Clough v. Steen, 3 Cal. App. 2d 392, 39 P.2d 889 (Dist. Ct. App. 1934) (plaintiff
could not recover for "profound shock" which caused mental and physical disorders ensuing
from the sight of her dead child who was killed in an automobile accident).
107. Maury v. United States, 139 F. Supp. 532 (N.D. Cal. 1956) (parents were barred
from recovering for emotional distress when a fire caused by defendant's negligence de-
stroyed their home and burned their child to death even though they were present at
the scene and had full knowledge that their child was inside the house, unable to escape
or be rescued); Minkus v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 44 F. Supp. 10 (N.D. Cal. 1942) (recov-
ery was denied in an action for breach of warranty brought by parents alleging nervous
shock occasioned by their child suffering bodily injury as a result of partially consuming
a soft drink containing a decomposed mouse); Reed v. Moore, 156 Cal. App. 2d 43, 319
P.2d 80 (Dist. Ct. App. 1958).
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a successful action could not be maintained. California had not adopted the
"zone of physical risk" doctrine as such, but it is obvious that if the plaintiff
must reasonably fear for his own safety in order to recover, a fortliori, he must
be within the zone of physical peril. The decided cases were not inconsistent
with that doctrine. However, its first appearance was not until Reed v. Moore,08
wherein it was stipulated that plaintiff was fearful solely for her husband's
safety and could not be considered within the zone of danger.1°3
Then, in 1963, the landmark decision in Amiaya v. Home Ice, Fuel & Supply
Co.110 was rendered. At the time of the accident, plaintiff was pregnant and
the mother of a seventeen-month-old infant. She alleged that she was standing
near"' the infant when defendant's truck, negligently operated, approached the
child. Plaintiff having shouted a warning to no avail, witnessed the child run
over by defendant's truck, thereby sustaining extreme emotional distress. Plain-
tiff declined the court's offer to allow her to amend her complaint to read "that
the fright and shock suffered by the plaintiff was for the fear of her own
safety.""' Instead, plaintiff asserted that her distress was due to fear for the
safety of her child. The trial court entered judgment for defendant but was
reversed on appeal."i 3 The Supreme Court of California reversed and reinstated
the judgment of the trial court, holding that the complaint failed to state facts
sufficient to constitute a cause of action.
The court's decision was based on two broad grounds: (1) the administrative
factor, and (2) the socio-economic and moral factors. The administrative factor
is premised upon the concept that "[iiustice ...exists only when it can be
effectively administered.""i 4 The problem of proof is one aspect of this
factor;" 15 another is limiting liability for mental distress caused by the appre-
hension of peril or injury to a third person."16 The limitation of defendant's
108. 156 Cal. App. 2d 43, 319 P.2d 80 (Dist. Ct. App. 1958).
109. Id. at 44, 319 P.2d at 81.
110. 59 Cal. 2d 295, 379 P.2d 513, 29 Cal. Rptr. 33 (1963).
111. There is no indication that plaintiff was in the immediate vicinity of the child.
Apparently, she was not, as in the course of an opinion denying recovery, the court stated:
"[Ifn cases where the defendant's conduct involved negligent driving of a motor vehicle the
courts conclude that to extend liability to spectators who were not themselves in danger
'would, in our opinion, place an unreasonable burden upon users of highways.'" Id. at 314,
379 P.2d at 524-25, 29 Cal. Rptr. at 44-45 (citation omitted).
112. Id. at 298, 379 P.2d at 514, 29 Cal. Rptr. at 34.
113. Amaya v. Home Ice, Fuel & Supply Co., 23 Cal. Rptr. 131 (Dist. CL App. 1962).
114. 59 Cal. 2d at 310, 379 P.2d at 522, 29 Cal. Rptr. at 42.
115. The court said: "[W]e are left with the question of whether in this area of inquiry
where emotions play so large a role the law has now become suffidenty responsive to scien-
tific reality to redress the 'net balance of justice.' The question is a disturbing one, and can-
not be answered merely by invoking the rule that a conflict of expert testimony is for the
jury." Id. at 312, 379 P.2d at 523, 29 Cal. Rptr. at 43.
116. The court does discuss limitations of liability, e.g., the injury threatened or inflicted
must be serious, causing severe shock which results in actual physical harm; the action
should be confined to members of the immediate family; the plaintiff must be present at the
accident, suffering contemporaneous shock. The court rejected these limitations as arbitrary.
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liability in such cases is closely related to the second ground, the socio-economic
and moral factors. The inevitability of accidents in an increasingly complex
industrial society is such that the interest of potential plaintiffs in bystander
cases must be subordinated so that that society can function without an im-
possible financial burden." 7 Accordingly, "the social utility of such activities
[industry, commerce, transportation and the like] outweighs the somewhat
speculative interest of individuals to be free from the risk of the type of injury
here alleged."" 8 Secondly, the defendant's culpability must be considered.
Compensation in our legal system is based on the concept of fault. Hence, where
defendant's act is merely negligent, rather than intentional, a lesser degree of
liability should attach. This court is in full agreement with the Waube decision
in which that court stated: "[T]he liability imposed by such a doctrine [re-
covery for physical injuries sustained by one out of the range of ordinary
physical peril as a result of witnessing another's danger] is wholly out of
proportion to the culpability of the negligent tort-feasor .... ,,119
Approximately five years after Amaya, in Dillon v. Legg,120 the Supreme
Court of California sustained a cause of action for mental distress suffered by a
plaintiff who was not within the zone of physical danger and another who may
have been within that zone. The cause of action arose when a child was killed
by defendant's negligently operated car as the child attempted to cross a road-
way. The child's mother and sister witnessed the accident. The opinion is un-
clear as to where the mother was positioned at the time, but it was determined
that the sister was at the curb. The mother sued for mental distress inflicted
upon the infant sister as well as for her own mental distress at having witnessed
Id. at 312-13, 379 P.2d at 523-24, 29 Cal. Rptr. at 43-44. See also W. Prosser at 353-54.
The limitations considered, and ultimately rejected, by the court are substantially those pro-
posed by the Restatement for the area of intentional infliction of damage. See Restatement
(Second) of Torts § 46(2) (1965). See also Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 306, 312-13,
436, 436A (1965).
117. The court did recognize insurance as a means of compensation thereby placing the
risk of loss upon the many rather than the few. Thus, the cost of that compensation would
be spread over those who are not, as well as those who are, liable for plaintiff's injury. The
court concluded, however, that the present system of insurance could not "adequately and
fairly" absorb the consequences of extending liability in the instant case. Further, the "activi-
ties of everyday life" which may give rise to a cause of action should such extension be
permitted, are all too often "either uninsurable or customarily uninsured." 59 Cal. 2d at 314,
379 P.2d at 525, 29 Cal. Rptr. at 45.
118. Id.
119. Waube v. Warrington, 216 Wis. 603, 613, 258 N.W. 497, 501 (1935).
120. 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968). There is an interesting
sidelight to the Amaya-Dillon decisions. Justice Tobriner wrote the Amaya opinion allowing
recovery in the District Court of Appeal. He was reversed in the Supreme Court of Cali-
fornia by Justices Schauer, Traynor, McComb and White (the last sitting pro tem). Jus-
tices Peters, Gibson and Peek dissented. When Dillon was decided by the Supreme Court
of California, Tobriner was on the bench of that court and, not surprisingly, wrote the




the tragedy. The decision permitting recovery (and, in the process, overruling
Amaya) represents a radical departure from the prior law of California and a
total divergence from the vast body of case law in the United States generally.
The very contentions which compelled the Ainaya court to deny recovery
were re-examined and ultimately rejected in Dillon.121 Of greater significance,
however, is the fact that Dillon discards the "zone of physical risk" doctrine.
The court artfully exposed the weakness of that doctrine:
[Tihe complaint here presents the claim of the emotionally traumatized mother, who
admittedly was not within the zone of danger, as contrasted with that of the sister,
who may have been within it. The case thus illustrates the fallacy of the rule that
would deny recovery in the one situation and grant it in the other. In the first place,
we can hardly justify relief to the sister for trauma which she suffered upon appre-
hension of the child's death and yet deny it to the mother merely because of a
happenstance that the sister was some few yards closer to the accident. The instant
case exposes the hopeless artificiality of the zone-of-danger rule. In the second place,
to rest upon the zone-of-danger rule when we have rejected the impact rule becomes
even less defensible .... The zone-of-danger concept must, then, inevitably collapse
because the only reason for the requirement of presence in that zone lies in the fact
that one within it will fear the danger of impact.'22
While the Dillon case does attempt to fix some guidelines in determining the
scope of defendant's liability, courts will, in effect, consider each set of facts on
a case-by-case basis, applying to each the general principles of negligence.12
It will be interesting to observe the effect, if any, that Dillon will have upon
future case law in this country.12 4
121. The argument that recovery upon a valid claim should be denied to prevent fraudu-
lent claims was rejected because the argument proceeds from a doubtful factual assumption
and the existence of potential fraud does not justify foreclosing the many legitimate claims.
Id. at 736-39, 441 P.2d at 917-18, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 77-78. The problem of proof is no
greater in such cases than where the mental distress is alleged as an aggravation of, or
"parasitic" to, an established tort, or where, if inflicted intentionally, constitutes an indepen-
dent tort. Id. at 738, 441 P.2d at 918-19, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 78-79. The inability to fix
limits of liability on the different facts of future cases is not justification for denying re-
covery where the facts of the specific case before the court clearly dictate liability. As a
general rule, the court will determine liability in terms of reasonable foreseeability, that is,
was the accident and harm reasonably foreseeable by defendant as a reasonably prudent
man. Id. at 739-46, 441 P2d at 919-921, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 79-81. That administrative effective-
ness is essential to justice cannot be debated. However, the floodgate theory was rejected
without ill effects in other areas of the law, e.g., product liability, and can afford no rational
basis for denying recovery where a bystander alleges mental distress caused by witnessing
danger or injury to a third person. Id. at 746-47, 441 P.2d at 922-24, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 82-84.
122. Id. at 733, 441 P.2d at 915, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 75.
123. These guidelines are not exact and rigid formulas for allowing or denying recovery,
but will aid the court in ascertaining the degree of defendant's foreseeability. Id. at 740-41,
441 P2d at 920-21, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 80-81. The presence of certain factors will constitute a
prima fade case. Id. at 740, 441 P.2d at 921, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 81.
124. As noted above, the Amaya case played an important role in certain New York




It would seem natural that a person witnessing injury to another would suffer
shock or fright to some degree; and, where the onlooker is a parent witnessing
danger or harm to his or her child, the proposition that such fright would result
in mental distress of a serious nature is especially persuasive. Still, the vast
majority of American courts deny recovery to the interested bystander. The
sounder decisions are based upon a concept of duty rather than proximate
cause; that is, the defendant's act must be a breach of duty owed to the plain-
tiff and not to someone else. But when a child is injured or placed in peril of
injury, "it is not beyond contemplation that its [parent] will be somewhere in
the vicinity, and will suffer serious shock."12 5 The situation is even more in-
comprehensible when one considers that a bystander who is injured by a flying
piece of debris caused by a collision has a right of action whereas one who
suffers injury merely through his senses is denied recovery. The relationship of
the defendant to the plaintiff is the same in both cases.120
Perhaps, the true rationale of the cases is to be found in practical expedi-
ency.127 The danger of "vexatious suits and fictitious claims" is real, but not
impossible to avoid. The effects of fear upon the total structure of the human
body serve to "show that judicial language formulated, at a time when no one
knew so much about the human organism as we do now, was inaccurate. '12
8
Fear is more than a purely emotional and subjective response. There are
marked physical reactions which, in certain cases, have deep and significant
effects upon the entire human organism. 120 Mental distress induced by fear is,
therefore, capable of clear and convincing proof.
Granted that there is adequate proof to show the existence of mental injury,
there is yet another troublesome problem-that of the "idiosyncratic plain-
tiff." 30 This issue attains its importance due to the general rule of damages that
the tortfeasor takes his victim as he finds him and is liable even for unforesee-
able consequences.' 3' The problem has been stated in these terms: "Assume for
the moment that study of the claimant's pre-traumatic personality shows a
neurotic constitution or condition sufficient to make the subject an extreme re-
actor to stimuli which would only mildly affect the average person, if at all. In
his case a $5.00 touch may become a $10,000 disability. Shall the law protect
125. W. Prosser at 353.
126. Annot., 18 A.L.R.2d 220, 240 (1951).
127. "It is now more or less generally conceded that the only vaild objection against
recovery for mental injury is the danger of vexatious suits and fictitious claims, which has
loomed very large in the opinions as an obstacle." W. Prosser at 347.
128. Goodrich, Emotional Disturbance as Legal Damage, 20 Mich. L. Rev. 497, 501
(1922).
129. See id. at 499-501 where it is demonstrated that fear is a physical response with
specific physical effects upon the human body.
130. "An injury seems to be considered idiosyncratic when the psychic stimulus is pat-
ently inadequate to arouse excessive physiological manifestations in an average person."
McNiece at 65.
131. See cases cited in Amdursky at 352-53 n.96.
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this fragile fellow to the full, or where shall legal and social policy draw the
lines limiting the compensation he may obtain?"' 32
The rationale for imposing such liability on the defendant is that "as be-
tween the tortfeasor who started the chain of circumstances resulting in the
injury and the entirely innocent plaintiff, the tortfeasor should suffer the con-
sequences"133 On the other hand, it has been suggested that ordinary principles
of tort law should be applied to such a plaintiff,134 creating, in effect, the
"ordinary plaintiff" much in the same fashion that courts construct the "reason-
ably prudent man" when determining a defendant's liability.135 Thus, a plain-
tiff's pre-existing mental disorder may be considered on the question of whether
or not his mental injury was proximately caused by defendant's act.130
"Duty" is not absolute. Rather, it is a relative concept shifting its limits as
social needs and policy dictate. That which is a legally unprotected interest
today may come within the realm of the protected tomorrow. But a sound
public policy does not operate to protect the interest of the plaintiff to the
exclusion of the defendant's interest. It seeks, instead, to balance these con-
flicting interests. Where should the courts draw the line? Concrete limitations
have been proposed 137 but these are subject to the criticism that, in time, they
may become overly mechanical and serve no better purpose than prior arbitrary
tests (e.g., the "impact" rule).
The issue of bystander recovery is not susceptible to solution by the state-
ment of a general rule. Perhaps, all that can be done is to allow the courts, on
the facts of each case, to determine if defendant's act created a risk of emotional
harm to the plaintiff, if such risk was reasonably foreseeable and if the act did, in
fact, proximately cause the plaintiff's injury. "[T] hese questions will be solved
most justly by applying general principles of... negligence, and... mechanical
rules of thumb which are at variance with these principles do more harm than
good."' 38
132. Smith & Solomon, Traumatic Neuroses in Court, 30 Va. L. Rev. 87, 99 (1943).
See also McNiece at 67-79.
133. McNiece at 77.
134. Amdursky at 352.
135. See Comment, Negligence and the Infliction of Emotional Harm: A Reappraisal
of the Nervous Shock Cases, 35 U. Chi. L. Rev. 512, 516 (1968).
136. The presence or absence of a pre-existing condition should not, however, be a
factor in determining defendant's liability. It goes merely to the extent of damages. Thus,
"expert testimony should be introduced in order to show what the average reaction would
be to such a stimulus [defendant's act], and, if the plaintiff's reaction has not been that
of the average individual, he should not recover at all, or at least his damages should be
reduced to a small amount." McNiece at 76-77.
137. See note 116 supra.
138. 2 F. Harper & F. James, Torts 1039 (1956).
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